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Indonesia implements dualism of judicial review system because there are two different judicial in-
stitutions that are granted the authority to review laws and regulations, namely the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court. This research aims to analyse the problems caused by the dualism of 
judicial review system. It found two main legal problems of the current system. First, there is an in-
consistency of decisions concerning judicial review cases for the same legal issues decided by the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Second, there is no mechanism to review the constitu-
tionality of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) decisions and regulations under the level of law. 
Based on these findings, this research suggests that the authority to review all laws and regulations 
should be integrated under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 
 




Indonesia menerapkan dualisme sistem pengujian norma hukum, sebab terdapat dua institusi penga-
dilan berbeda yang diberikan kewenangan untuk melakukan pengujian peraturan perundang-undang-
an. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menganalisa permasalahan yang diakibatkan dari dualisme sistem ter-
sebut. Pertama, adanya inkonsistensi putusan pengujian peraturan perundang-undangan terhadap isu 
yang sama yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi dan Mahkamah Agung. Kedua, tidak adanya me-
kanisme untuk menguji konstitusionalitas Ketetapan MPR dan peraturan di bawah undang-undang. 
Berdasarkan temuan tersebut, artikel ini menyarankan agar kewenangan untuk menguji seluruh pera-
turan perundang-undangan sebaiknya diintegrasikan di bawah kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi. 
 





Judicial review refers to the authority of 
a court to review the constitutionality of legis-
lative and executive actions. It means that a 
court can invalidate laws or decisions contrary 
to higher laws or regulations, particularly the 
Constitution. The term of judicial review is of-
ten used interchangeably with constitutional re-
view. Nevertheless, judicial review has a broa-
der meaning compared than a constitutional re-
view. In this context, judicial review can both 
examine the constitutional validity of laws and 
regulations as well as administrative actions and 
decisions, while constitutional review is more 
specific to review the constitutionality of laws 
and regulations. 
Judicial review was first exercised by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the 1803 case of Marbury 
vs Madison,1 but long before that case, there 
was a case of judicial review of Dr. Bonham’s 
case decided by the Court of Common Pleas in 
England in 1610.2 There are two main models of 
judicial review, namely the American model and 
the European model. The first model is also 
known as the decentralised model in which the 
                                                          
1  See William Benoit and J. D. Agostine, “‘The case of the 
midnight judges’ and Multiple Audience Discourse: Chief 
Justice Marshall and Marbury v. Madison”, The Southern 
Communication Journal, Vol. 59 No. 2, March 1994, 
Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, pages 89-96. 
2  See R. A. Edwards, “Bonham’s Case: The Ghost in the 
Constitutional Machine”, Denning Law Journal, Vol. 11 
No. 1, 1996, Buckingham: University of Buckingham 
Press, page 63-90. 
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judicial review authority is exercised by the Su-
preme Court and other lower courts. This model 
is used in countries such as the United States of 
America, Australia, Canada, India and the Phi-
lippines. The second model is also known as the 
centralised model or the European model.3 This 
model gives the authority to review the consti-
tutionality of laws to the Constitutional Court as 
a separate judicial institution from the Supreme 
Court, as occurs in countries such as Austria, 
Germany, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. 
The innovation in this constitutional system has 
been influenced by Hans Kelsen (1881-1973).4 
Therefore, this model is also known as the Kel-
senian model.5 Indonesian judicial review sys-
tem follows this Kelsenian model.  
The Indonesian Constitution granted au-
thority to review the constitutionality of natio-
nal laws to the Constitutional Court, whilst the 
Supreme Court is granted an authority to review 
the legality of regulations below the level of na-
tional law. This mechanism creates a dualism of 
judicial review system that led to the complex-
ity of the legal system in Indonesia. The ques-
tion is what are the legal problems caused by 
the dualism of judicial reviews system adopted 
in Indonesia? and how can the problems be pre-
vented or solved?  
 
Discussion 
Legal Policy of Judicial Review System 
                                                          
3  Victor Ferreres Comella, “The European Model of Con-
stitutional Review of Legislation: Toward decentraliza-
tion?”, ICON - International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, Vol. 2 No. 3, July 2004, New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press and New York University School of Law, pages 
461-491. 
4  Hans Kelsen, “Judicial Review of Legislation: A Compar-
ative Study of the Austrian and the American Constitu-
tion”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 4, May 1942, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, pages 183-200. 
5  See Christoph Bezemek, “A Kelsenian Model of Con-
stitutional Adjudication: The Austrian Constitutional 
Court”, Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht, Vol. 67, 
March 2012, Vienna: Springer, pages 115-128; Sara Lagi, 
“Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitutional Court 
(1918-1929)”, Co-herencia, Vol. 9 No. 16, June 2012, 
Medellín: Universidad EAFIT, pages 273-295; S. Amaral-
Garcia, N. Garoupa and V. Grembi, “Judicial Indepen-
dence and Party Politics in the Kelsenian Constitutional 
Courts: The Case of Portugal”, Journal of Emperical Le-
gal Studies, Vol. 6 No. 2, June 2009, New Jersey: Cor-
nell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, pages 381-404. 
The development of judicial review in In-
donesian judicial system can be divided into 
three main periods: the Soekarno era from 1945 
to 1966; the Soeharto era from 1966 to 1998 
and the constitutional reform era from 1998 to 
present. As explained previously, the current 
judicial review in Indonesia follows the Euro-
pean or the Centralised model of judicial re-
view. In 1949, however, Indonesia followed the 
American or the decentralised model of judicial 
review. In this section, I will discuss the devel-
opment of legal policy regarding judicial review 
system in Indonesia by tracing the three diffe-
rent periods mentioned above. 
 
First Period: Soekarno Era (1945-1966) 
Although the mechanism of constitutional 
review was finally formed after the Constitu-
tional Court establishment in 2003, the discus-
sion and debate about the need for a constitu-
tional review system had occurred in the draft-
ing process of the first Indonesian Constitution, 
prior to independence in 1945. During a meeting 
of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory 
Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Pe-
nyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia or BPUPKI) in July 1945, one of the 
constitutional drafters, Muhammad Yamin, pro-
posed that the Supreme Court (Balai Agung) 
should have a power to review laws not only 
against the Constitution but also customary law 
and Islamic law. Yamin used the term of ‘com-
paring’ (membanding), which refers to the term 
of ‘reviewing’ (menguji).6 
The proposal delivered by Yamin was 
challenged by another BPUPKI member, Soepo-
mo, citing two main reasons. The first reason 
was that Indonesia did not adopt the concept of 
separation of powers as implemented by other 
countries. Therefore, the judiciary could not 
control the other state powers in making laws. 
According to Soepomo, the issue whether a law 
was contrary to the Constitution or not was not 
a judicial matter, but a political matter. He also 
                                                          
6  Saafroedin Bahar et al, 1995, Risalah Sidang Badan Pe-
nyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(BPUPKI), Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(PPKI) 26 Mei 1945 - 22 Agustus 1945, Jakarta: Sekreta-
riat Negara Republik Indonesia, page 295. 




argued that the judicial review system would 
not be appropriate in the Indonesian context.7  
The second reason was that Indonesian 
legal experts did not have much experience in 
exercising a judicial review system at that time. 
Soepomo compared Indonesia with Austria, Ger-
many and the Czech Republic that had special 
courts to deal with constitutional matters. For 
these reasons, he suggested that Indonesia was 
not ready to apply the judicial review system. 
Given that there was no consensus during the 
meeting, Yamin’s proposal to give judicial re-
view power to the Supreme Court was not inser-
ted into the 1945 Constitution.8 
Furthermore, the 1945 Constitution en-
acted on 18 August 1945 was replaced by the 
Constitution of the Republic of the United Sta-
tes of Indonesia or the RIS Constitution (1949-
1950). The provisions contained in the RIS Cons-
titution were strongly influenced by the United 
States, including the adoption of the American 
model of judicial review. The RIS Constitution 
set a judicial review mechanism that authorised 
the Supreme Court and other ordin-ary courts to 
review the constitutionality of fe-deral or state 
laws.9 However, the RIS Constitution was appli-
ed for less than one year, from 27 December 
1949 until 17 August 1950, and there was not a 
single case handled by the Supreme Court rela-
ted to judicial review. 
Moreover, Indonesia changed the RIS Con-
stitution to 1950 Provisional Constitution (1950-
1959). The 1950 Provisional Constitution was in-
tended to be temporary until a permanent con-
stitution was formed. During the constitutional 
drafting, the Indonesian Judges Association 
(IKAHI) suggested that the Supreme Court 
should have a power to review the constitution-
ality of legislations. The proposal was discussed 
in the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), 
which had been established based on the results 
of the 1955 General Elections to form a perma-
nent Constitution. In their discussions, the Con-
stituent Assembly agreed to establish a special 
                                                          
7  Ibid, page 305. 
8  Ibid, page 306. 
9  See Article 156 of the Constitution of Union Republic of 
Indonesia. 
court consisting of justices who were authorised 
to review legislations. 
Unfortunately, after conducting the ses-
sions for two and a half years, the Constituent 
Assembly was unable to complete the main task 
of forming a permanent Constitution due to a 
deadlock among its members, particularly on a 
very sensitive issue related to concepts and re-
lations between state and religion. Consequent-
ly, an initial agreement to establish a judicial 
review system could not be implemented. Given 
that the Constituent Assembly could not mana-
ge to create a new Constitution for replacing 
the 1950 Provisional Constitution, President 
Soekarno declared the Presidential Decree of 5 
July 1959 to dissolve the Constituent Assembly 
and to restore the validity of the 1945 Constitu-
tion as the permanent Constitution of Indone-
sia.10 
 
Second Period: Soeharto Era (1966-1998) 
Discussions for creating a judicial review 
system also occurred during the New Order un-
der the Soeharto’s administration (1965-1998). 
Based on Law No. 14 Year 1970 concerning the 
Judicial Power, the Supreme Court was granted 
a power of judicial review.11 However, the po-
wer was limited to review of regulations against 
laws. The Judicial Power Law did not regulate 
the mechanism to review the constitutionality 
of laws. Moreover, the related provisions were 
amended by Law No. 14 Year 1985 concerning 
the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the new provi-
sions asserted that the Supreme Court only had 
a power to review regulations below national 
laws against laws only, but not against the Con-
stitution.12 
The absence of a constitutional review 
system at that time was caused by the Indone-
sian constitutional structure that implemented 
the distribution of a power system. Consequent-
ly, it created supremacy of parliament in the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permu-
                                                          
10  See Presidential Decree No. 150 Year 1959 concerning 
the Decree of the President of the Republic of In-
donesia/Supreme Commander of the War Armed Forces 
Concerning the Return to the 1945 Constitution. 
11  Article 26 of the Judicial Power Law. 
12  Article 31 of the Supreme Court Law. 
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syawaratan Rakyat or MPR). In practice, the 
doctrine meant other branches of government 
were not allowed to intervene with the legisla-
tive branch powers. In addition, the absence of 
constitutional review mechanisms was consider-
ed a deliberate action by Soeharto to maintain 
power. 
Despite this view, Soeharto genuinely and 
consistently suggested implementing the 1945 
Constitution in his speeches. Lacking a state in-
stitution with authority to review and interpret 
the 1945 Constitution, Soeharto held full power 
in interpreting the laws that perpetuated his 
authority for 32 years. As a result, there were 
only 12 cases relating to judicial review after 
the Supreme Court was given a limited power of 
judicial review in 1970 until the constitutional 
reform occurred in 1998.13 
 
Third Period: Constitutional Reform (1998-
Present) 
Discussion on the need of a constitutional 
review system re-occurred during the constitu-
tional amendment process in 2000. After discus-
sing the mechanism, the MPR issued Decision 
No. III/MPR/2000 granting the MPR a power to 
review the constitutionality of laws. The parlia-
ment supremacy doctrine was the main founda-
tion in establishing this mechanism. However, it 
cannot be categorised as a judicial review me-
chanism since the power would be exercised by 
the legislative, not by the judiciary. Thus, this 
mechanism is best categorised as legislative re-
view, not judicial review. However, the MPR 
never exercised its power because the system 
was not clear. Therefore, the MPR members 
proposed to establish a judicial institution cal-
led the Constitutional Court.14 
The MPR members were divided into two 
opinions for determining judicial review powers 
to be granted to the Constitutional Court. The 
first opinion was that the Constitutional Court 
                                                          
13  See Zainal Arifin Hoesein, 2009, Judicial Review di Mah-
kamah Agung: Tiga Dekade Pengujian Peraturan Perun-
dang-undangan, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada.  
14  For comparative study of constitutional courts establish-
ment, see Francisco R. Romeu, “The Establishment of 
Constitutional Courts: A Study of 128 Democratic Consti-
tutions”, Review of Law & Economic, Vol. 2 No. 6, Au-
gust 2006, Berlin: De Gruyter, pages 103-135. 
should only review the constitutionality of law, 
while regulations under the national law could 
only be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The 
main reason was to avoid practical difficulties 
related to the high number of laws and regula-
tions directly related to the litigation process 
handled by the Supreme Court and lower ordi-
nary courts.15 The second opinion was that the 
constitutionality of all laws and regulations 
should be reviewed by the Constitutional Court. 
The aim of incorporating this constitutional 
review mechanism was to obtain consistent con-
siderations and decisions in judicial review ca-
ses, as practiced in other countries.16 
The final decision inserted into the Con-
stitution was that the Constitutional Court could 
only review the constitutionality of national 
laws, while the Supreme Court retained the po-
wer to review the legality of regulations. Thus, 
the current judicial review system in Indonesia 
is embracing the dualism of judicial review sys-
tem exercised by the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court. Consequently, the judicial 
review mechanism becomes more complicated, 
as I will explain below. 
 
Dualism of Judicial Review System 
In the Indonesian legal system, there 
exists a hierarchical structure of laws adopted 
from the pyramid of law theory by Hans Kelsen, 
known as Stufenbau des Rechts. Presently, the 
types and hierarchy of laws in Indonesia consist 
of the 1945 Constitution, People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) Decision, Law or Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law (Interim Emergency 
Law or Perppu), Government Regulation, Presi-
dential Regulation, Provincial Regulation and 
Regency/City Regulation. The legal power of 
those laws is in accordance with the hierarch-
ical structure ranging from the highest to the 
lowest level. 
Regarding the judicial review system, In-
donesia has two separate mechanisms. The first 
mechanism is that the Constitutional Court can 
                                                          
15  See Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indone-
sia, 2008, Risalah Rapat ke-36 Panitia Ad Hoc I, Badan 
Pekerja MPR, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 
pages 340, 344, 434, 436, 531. 
16  Ibid, pages 357, 435, 437, 554. 




only review the constitutionality of laws en-
acted by the President and the House of Repre-
sentative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR). 
The second mechanism is that only the Supreme 
Court can review the legality of regulations be-
low the level of law, this includes Government 
Regulation, Presidential Regulation, Provincial 
Regulation and Regency/City Regulation.17 In 
my view, this dualism has created at least three 
legal problems in the constitutional review 
system in Indonesia. 
First, if the Constitutional Court can only 
review the constitutionality of laws, while the 
Supreme Court can review regulations against 
laws, not against the Constitution, no legal me-
chanism is provided to review regulations or de-
cisions against the Constitution. In other words, 
there is no mechanism available to review the 
constitutionality of regulations and decisions 
under the level of law. For instance, the cons-
titutionality of 365 regional regulations in Indo-
nesia, considered discriminatory by the National 
Commission on Violence against Women (Kom-
nas Perempuan), cannot be reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court.18 
Second, the dualism of judicial review 
system in Indonesia creates an inconsistency of 
interpretations between laws and the imple-
menting of regulations. For example, the Supre-
me Court declared Decision Number 15/P/HUM/ 
2009 on  June 18th 2009 concerning judicial re-
view on the National Election Commission Regu-
lation No. 15 Year 2009. Problematically, the 
Supreme Court gave a different interpretation 
to the Constitutional Court’s previous interpre-
tation for the same case. Consequently, there 
was an inconsistency of interpretation in deci-
ding the case. In the end, the Constitutional 
Court had to declare another decision in the 
Parliamentary Seats Phase III (2009) case to cor-
                                                          
17  Article 24A and Article 24C of the Indonesian Constitu-
tion as well as Article 9 of Law No 12 of 2011 on the Es-
tablishment of Laws and Regulations. 
18  Ihsanuddin, 20 March 2015, “Komnas Perempuan Minta 
Presiden Jokowi Hapus 365 Perda yang Diskriminatif”, 
Kompas, available at http://nasional.kompas.com/ 
read/2015/03/20/ 11583441/Komnas.Perempuan.Minta. 
Presiden.Jokowi.Hapus.365.Perda.yang.Diskriminatif, 
accessed on  April 10th 2016. 
rect the Supreme Court’s interpretation that 
caused a national political uproar. 
Whereas that in this decision the Consti-
tutional Court did not assess or review 
either the Supreme Court’s decision or 
the General Election Commission Regula-
tion... However, since Article 205(4), Ar-
ticle 211(3) and Article 212(3) of Law No. 
10 Year 2008 has been assessed by the 
Constitutional Court as conditionally con-
stitutional, then by itself all the contents 
of regulations or the court decisions 
which are not in accordance with this de-
cision becomes invalid due to loss of its 
basis.19 
 
After the Constitutional Court declared 
the decision, indirectly annulling the Supreme 
Court decision, no institutional conflict occur-
red between them. However, if such inconsist-
ency of interpretation occurs frequently, then, 
most likely, conflict or dispute will result bet-
ween the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Court, as emerged in other countries.20 This 
conflict may occur because the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court is not granted power to as-
sess or examine the Supreme Court decisions. 
This system is different from, for instance, the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany which 
is formally given the power to re-examine the 
Supreme Court decisions related to fundamental 
rights violations of citizens using the constitu-
tional complaint mechanism.21 
                                                          
19  See Constitutional Court Decision No. 110-111-112-113/ 
PUU-VII/2009. 
20  See Lech Garlicki, “Constitutional Courts versus Su-
preme Courts”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law, Vol. 5 No. 1, January 2007, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press and New York University School of Law, 
pages 44-68. 
21  For further discussion of constitutional complaint, see 
Pan Mohamad Faiz, “A Prospect and Challenges for 
Adopting Constitutional Complaint and Constitutional 
Question in the Indonesian Constitutional Court”, Con-
stitutional Review, Vol. 2 No.1, May 2016, Jakarta: The 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, page 
103-128; Gerhard Dannemann, “Constitutional Com-
plaints: The European Perspective”, The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43 No. 1 January 
1994, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, page 142-
153; Nazlı Can Ülvan, “Constitutional Complaint and In-
dividual Complaint in Turkey”, Ankara Bar Review, Vol. 
6 No. 2, 2013, Ankara: Ankara Bar Association, pages 
179-186; Aušra Kargaudienė, “Individual Constitutional 
Complaint in Lithuania: Conception and the Legal 
Issues”, Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Vol. 4 No. 1, 
January 2011, Berlin: De Gruyter, page 154-168. 
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Third, in the previous judicial review sys-
tem, the MPR decision was not placed in the 
hierarchy of laws.22 Currently, it is in the hier-
archy of laws under the Constitution, but it is 
above the level of law. As a result, the constitu-
tionality of MPR decisions cannot be reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court since the Court can 
only review the constitutionality of laws or in-
terim emergency laws. The absence of this me-
chanism has been confirmed by the Constitutio-
nal Court’s decision, stating that the Court does 
not have a power to review the constitutionality 
of the MPR decisions.23 Thus, the MPR decisions 
have caused a constitutional problem in the 
hierarchy of laws because it cannot be reviewed 
by judicial institutions, neither the Constitutio-
nal Court nor the Supreme Court.24 
Based on the three major problems ex-
plained above, I am of the opinion that the con-
stitutional review of all laws and regulations un-
der the Constitution should be integrated into 
one judicial institution in order to resolve the 
dualism of the judicial review system in Indone-
sia. Establishing a constitutional review mech-
anism under a one-roof system can cover the 
vacuum of legal remedy. In addition, it can pre-
vent inconsistency of interpretations in a judi-
cial review case decided by the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Court. By considering 
several factors, such as experiences in deciding 
constitutional review cases,25 the numbers of 
                                                          
22  See Article 7 of Law No. 10 of 2004 on the Establishment 
of Laws and Regulations. 
23  See Constitutional Court Decision Number 24/PUU-XI/ 
2013 and Number 75/PUU-XII/2014. 
24  For further discussion of MPR, see Januari Sihotang and 
Andy Omara, “Kedudukan Ketetapan Majelis Permusya-
waratan Rakyat dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 
2011 dan Implikasi Yuridisnya terhadap Sistem Peru-
ndang-Undangan di Indonesia”, Jurnal Penelitian Hukum 
Gadjah Mada, Vol. 1 No. 1 November 2012, Yogyakarta: 
Fakultas Hukum Universitas Gadjah Mada; Saifudin and 
Dessy Ariani, “Kajian Yuridis Eksistensi dan Materi Kete-
tapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indone-
sia dalam Hirarki Perundang-Undangan di Indonesia”, 
Jurnal Hukum IUS QUIA IUSTUM, Vol. 22 No. 1 January 
2015, Yogyakarta: Universitas Islam Indonesia, pages 
142-162. 
25  At the time of writing, the Constitutional Court has 
been deciding 879 cases related to the constitutionality 
of laws since 2003. Additionally, the Constitutional 
Court Justices have a specific background and expertise 
in constitutional law. In contrast, the Supreme Court 
Justices who have diverse backgrounds only examined 
caseloads that have not been decided,26 and the 
specificity of functions,27 I argue that the Con-
stitutional Court should carry out the review of 
the constitutionality of all laws and regulations. 
The addition and transfer of judicial review po-
wer from the Supreme Court to the Constitu-
tional Court should be done, ideally, through a 
Constitutional amendment in order to streng-
then its legal and constitutional legitimacy. 
Judicial Review System and  

















Source:  Law No. 12 Year 2011 concerning the Establishment 
of Laws and Regulations 
 
Furthermore, the need to establish an in-
tegrated constitutional review system in the 
Constitutional Court can also be seen in the Wa-
ter Resources cases. According to the first de-
cision in the Water Resources (2004) case,28 the 
Constitutional Court declared that the Water 
Resources Law was conditionally constitutional. 
This means that the Water Resources Law was 
constitutional on condition that the implement-
                                                                                        
fewer cases related to the legality of regulations and 
decisions. 
26  Up to October 2016, the Constitutional Court only has 
90 pending cases, while the Supreme Court still has 
5,361 pending cases. 
27  The function of the Constitutional Court is more focused 
on examining cases related to constitutional issues while 
the Supreme Court, as the highest institution of general 
courts, examines various types of cases ranging from 
criminal, civil, religious, military and administrative 
cases. 
28  See Constitutional Court Decision No. 058-059-060-063/ 
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ing regulations would be in accordance with the 
interpretation of the Court. The implementing 
regulations of the Waters Resources Law were 
made by the Government in a number of Gov-
ernment Regulations.29 In the second decision in 
the Water Resources (2013) case,30 the Consti-
tutional Court indirectly examined relevant Go-
vernment Regulations, whether it has been in 
line with the constitutional interpretation and 
guidelines according to its previous decision, or 
not. The Court concluded that the Government 
Regulations did not meet the basic principles 
and restrictions of water resources management 
created by the Constitutional Court. This deci-
sion clearly shows that the Constitutional Court 
has reviewed the constitutionality of govern-
ment regulations.31 However, the Court rea-
soned that the examination did not mean to re-
view the regulations.  
According to the Court, the only available 
way for the Constitutional Court to answer this 
question is to examine thoroughly the imple-
menting regulations of the Water Resources 
Law, in this case the government regulations. 
The Court reasoned that by taking this step it 
did not mean that the Constitutional Court con-
ducts judicial review of regulations made under 
any law against such law, but solely because of 
the requirements of the constitutionality of law 
which are being reviewed (c.q. the Water Re-
sources Law) are suspended on the obedience of 
regulations in implementing the Constitutional 
Court interpretation.32 
Referring to these cases, an integration of 
the constitutional review system becomes in-
                                                          
29  See the Government Regulation No. 16 of 2005 on De-
velopment of Water Supply System, the Government Re-
gulation No. 20 of 2006 on Irrigation, the Government 
Regulation No. 42 of 2008 on Water Resources Manage-
ment, the Government Regulation No. 42 of 2008 on 
Groundwater, the Government Regulation No. 38 of 
2011 on River and the Government Regulation No. 73 of 
2013 on Swamp. 
30  See Constitutional Court Decision Number 85/PUU-XI/ 
2013. 
31  Discussion on the impact of the Constitutional Court De-
cision on Water Resources (2013) case, see Izzatin Ka-
mala, “Harapan Baru Atas Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Air 
terkait Putusan MK Nomor 85/PUU-XI/2013”, Jurnal 
Konstitusi, Vol. 12 No. 3, September 2015, Jakarta: 
Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, pages 422-446. 
32  See Constitutional Court Decision Number 85/PUU-XI/ 
2013, page 143 para [3.28]. 
creasingly important. The Water Resources ca-
ses show that, although a law does not conflict 
with the Constitution, its implementing regula-
tions can be contrary to the Constitution. Given 
that neither the Constitutional Court nor the Su-
preme Court hold jurisdiction to examine the 
constitutionality of regulations or decisions, ma-
ny regulations or decisions considered contrary 
to Constitution are still implemented today. 
In addition, the Water Resources (2013) 
decision created a new practice of constitutio-
nal adjudication in Indonesia, whereby the 
Constitutional Court can review government re-
gulations indirectly, providing that the related 
laws, used as the legal basis for making the re-
gulations, have been declared conditionally 
constitutional or conditionally unconstitutional. 
This decision also creates jurisprudence for the 
Court as an entry point to examine the cons-
titutionality of government regulations or deci-
sions in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
Discussion about the need for a constitu-
tional review mechanism in the Indonesian judi-
cial system has been debated since the pre-in-
dependence in 1945. However, the idea was re-
jected because it was considered incompatible 
with the system and form of Indonesian gov-
ernment at that time. The constitutional review 
mechanism in Indonesia was formed for the first 
time in the RIS Constitution, yet there was not a 
single case of constitutional review lodged to 
the Supreme Court. The constitutional review 
mechanism was re-established after the consti-
tutional reform occurred in 1999 to 2002. The 
Constitutional Court was created to exercise the 
constitutional review power. 
However, there is a problem in the cur-
rent constitutional review system that places 
the Constitutional Court in a position that only 
serves to review the constitutionality of laws 
against the Constitution, while the Supreme 
Court merely serves to review the legality of 
regulations against laws. In other words, there 
is no mechanism to review the constitutionality 
of regulations below the level of national law, 
194 Jurnal Dinamika Hukum 
Vol. 16 No. 2, May 2016 
 
whereas many regulations and executive deci-
sions allegedly violate the Constitution. 
 
Suggestions 
The powers of judicial review granted to 
the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
are directly mandated by the Constitution. In 
the future, these jurisdictions should be integ-
rated to review all laws and regulations against 
the Constitution in the hands of the Constitu-
tional Court. Thus, consistency of interpretation 
in dealing with constitutional review cases can 
be well maintained. The most ideal way to in-
tegrate these jurisdictions is to amend the Con-
stitution concerning the judicial powers.  
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